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6 January 1964

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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### DAILY BRIEF

Cyprus: [Cyprus is slowly returning to normal and attention is now focused on the forthcoming five-party conference in London on the future of Cyprus]

[Nicosia remains calm, with only British patrols moving between the Greek and Turkish areas. Tripartite military (British-Greek-Turkish) helicopter patrols, however, are supplying badly needed food to villages outside Nicosia]

[Troops in the area of Turkey nearest Cyprus remain on normal alert, but the US Embassy in Ankara reports no evidence of imminent operations directed against Cyprus. The embassy believes that as long as the security situation on Cyprus continues to improve the Turks will focus attention on a political, rather than military, solution. Moreover, the chief of the Turkish General Staff reportedly said on 3 January that there is "no question concerning the fact that the Turkish military must not invade Cyprus now.]

[The British are pushing for a convening of the conference in London as early as 10 January, although there has been no basic change in the positions]

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of either Makarios or Vice President Kuchuk. The participants in the conference will be the UK, Greece, and Turkey, and representatives of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

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On British initiative, Athens and Ankara have joined London in informally asking the UN Secretary General to send a representative to Cyprus to observe the cease-fire. If an affirmative reply is received, the three powers will ask the Cyprus Government to join them in a formal request for such an observer.

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France - Communist China: [French officials are stressing the political advantages of closer relations between Paris and Peiping but there is still no firm indication of De Gaulle's intentions.]

[A high French Foreign Ministry official told the US Embassy on 3 January that it is not in the West's interest to favor the Soviet Union at the expense of Communist China, and that any long-term solution of Indo-Chinese problems would necessarily involve mainland China.]

[In late December, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville made much the same argument to the Australian ambassador. Couve pointed out that it was advantageous for Western Europe to develop close relations with Communist China, which forms a potential second front against the Soviet Union.]

[Foreign ministry sources claim no knowledge of when De Gaulle may move toward closer political relations with Peiping or whether he contemplates outright recognition at this time. De Gaulle told Ambassador Bohlen in early November that the US would be "informed" prior to any French move, although the ministry sources point out that this does not necessarily mean "consulted."]

[De Gaulle will probably discuss the political rationale for closer relations with Peiping at his press conference later this month. He may give some precise indication of the timing and nature of his intended moves.]

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Communist China - Africa: [Chinese Premier Chou En-lai has attempted to lend substance to his current African trip by making economic offers.]

[He is reported to have proposed that barter trade with Egypt be raised to \$140 million annually, about double the peak in 1960. Peiping could next year easily raise its imports--mainly cotton--from Cairo to the proposed level.]

[In Algeria, Chou urged that the \$50 million credit which China extended in October 1963 be used. He offered to build highways in Algeria and to accept Algerian oil in repayment.]

[Egypt is not likely to be interested in the Chinese proposal. Ben Bella would like to develop markets outside of France for Algerian oil, but Algeria is unable to supply the refined products which China wants.]

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Jamaica: [Prime Minister Bustamante, dissatisfied with the level of US economic assistance, is threatening to establish closer relations with the Soviet bloc]

[He is bitter because of Jamaica's failure to obtain US assistance for its five-year plan. This has hampered economic development during the past year, weakened his political position, and encouraged the opposition to press their attacks against his government]

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[Bustamante told a US businessman that Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan promised that the USSR would underwrite the five-year plan "in its entirety" after diplomatic relations had been established between the two countries. Bustamante might make an announcement to this effect at the West Indian "summit" meeting to be held in Kingston on 13 January]

[The US Embassy in Kingston comments that Bustamante's remarks appear to be part of a campaign by Jamaican officials to blackmail the US into increasing its economic assistance. The embassy points out, however, that the prime minister's impulsive and irrational temperament might cause him to follow a course without recognizing the consequences]

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Turkey: The six-week cabinet crisis has been at least temporarily resolved by the vote of confidence accorded Prime Minister Inonu's newly formed minority government on 4 January. The military, whose attitude is a critical element in the picture, will probably support the new government because of the need for unity during the Cyprus crisis and the lack of any practical alternative. The opposition Justice Party has avoided participating in the Inonu government, but will probably press for early elections once the Cyprus issue has subsided.

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